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Post-Kyoto Stress Disorder: How the United States Can Influence
International Climate Change Policy
By Derald J. Hay, Esq.*

"More than any other time in history, mankindfaces a crossroads.
One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total
extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly." Woody Allen'
If the predictions and conclusions of many scientists are true,
climate change has already had a significant impact on humans and the
environment. Scientists estimate that climate change has already claimed
the lives of 150,000 human beings.2 Additionally, more than five million
people, most of whom live in the poorest of nations, have fallen sick to
serious illnesses, like malaria that have spread because of climate change. 3
The future impact of climate change can only be hypothesized
based on several assumptions. The International Panel on Climate Change
("IPCC") has predicted that rain will be more prevalent in areas that are
already wet; 4 rain will decrease in dry regions that are already water

* Mr. Hay wrote this article pursuant to his studies as a graduate student at the Penn State
School of Forest Resources and Penn State Dickinson School of Law. Mr. Hay is now an
associate in the Environmental Practice Group at Fox Rothschild, LLP in Exton,
Pennsylvania. He graduated from Penn State Dickinson School of Law in 2007 with both
a Juris Doctor and Master of Science in Forest Resources. He would like to extend his
appreciation to Professor Dustin Hollis and Jamon Bollock for their insightful comments,
invaluable guidance, and innovative ideas. The views, opinions, and suggestions set forth
herein are solely of the author and should not be construed as those of Penn State, Fox
Rothschild or anyone other than the author.
' WOODY ALLEN, SIDE EFFECTS 79 (Mass Market Paperback 1980).
2 Jonathan

Patz, Impacts ofRegional Climate Change on Human Health, 438 NATURE
310, 314 (2005).
3

id.

4 Neil Adger et al., Climate Change 2007: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and

Vulnerability, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 7 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
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stressed; 5 and drought will worsen while flooding will be more frequent,
which can significantly stress subsistence living. 6 Furthermore, the IPCC
predicted that, at the lower latitudes, crop production will decline7 and the
coasts will erode, sea levels will rise, and millions of people will be
flooded every year by 2080.8
Climate change does not just affect the world we live in, but also
the health and welfare of those who live in it. The IPCC predicted that
malnutrition will be more prevalent; 9 more people will die of flooding,
heat waves, storms, fires, and droughts;1 0 more people will get cardiorespiratory diseases;" and infectious diseases will have new spatial
distributions.1 2 These are just some of the adverse effects that scientists
have predicted will result from the anthropogenic emission of greenhouse
gases ("GHGs") in the atmosphere. If these predictions are correct to any
significant degree, action is required by the world's leading economies,
particularly the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly organized a
framework convention to address the issue of anthropogenic impacts on
the Earth's climate due to the emission of greenhouse gases.' 3 Due to the
global nature of climate change, negotiations of a United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("FCCC") were convened to
s id.
6

id
id.

7

'Id. at 9.
9Id.
1

Id

12id
13Daniel Bodansky, The UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 454 (1993); see also United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaties Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter FCCC] ("Noting that there are many uncertainties in
predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and
regional patterns thereof"), availableat
http://unfccc.intlessential-background/convention/background/items/1350.php.
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bring as many of the world's countries to the table as possible. The
primary goals of these negotiations were both to educate the nations and to
outline several broad policies and goals concerning ways to help abate the
impact that humans were having on the environment.14 As a result, a
treaty text was adopted and subsequently ratified by more than one
hundred and eighty nations, including the United States.' 6
Several years later, the FCCC's parties met again in Kyoto, Japan
to develop a protocol that would outline the steps, procedures, and details
of how the goals and policies set forth in the Framework Convention could
be achieved.' 7 The Kyoto Protbcol that emerged was adopted and signed
by the State representatives at the meeting and sent to each nation for
ratification.1 The United States, despite being one of the major players
shaping the Protocol and the largest GHG emitting nation, decided to
effectively withdraw19 itself from even the obligations that being a
signatory to the Protocol carried with it. 20
14 Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of Parties
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 201, 204 (2000) (Framework conventions "lay down guiding principles to help
parties find an acceptable formula to address a problem. The precise formula is usually
contained in the protocols negotiated after the convention").
15
6 See FCCC, supra note 13.

1 Kevin A. Baumert, ParticipationofDeveloping Countries in the International
Climate
Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 365, 370 (2006).
7U.N. FCCC, 3rd Sess., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Conference of Parties, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7Add.1 (1997),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
18Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification (2007), availableat
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status ofratification/application/pdf/kp ratificatio
n.pdf (showing one-hundred eighty-four countries ratifying, accepting, acceding, or
approving of the text).
Shari L. Diener, Ratification ofKyoto Aside: How InternationalLaw and Market
UncertaintyObviate the Current US. Approach to Climate Change Emissions, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 2089, 2106 (2006).

(citing Greg Kahn, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush Administration,21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 548, 551 (2003)).
20

Although signing a treaty without ratifying it will not bind a nation to the obligations of
the treaty, customary international law still prohibits signatories from defeating the
"object and purpose" of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
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Today, political winds in the United States are shifting. Both
industry and the populace are urging the government to start taking steps
to address climate change.21 However, maybe the most significant shift of
winds came with the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA. 22
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") had the authority to regulate GHGS23 and was
compelled to make a judgment on how to regulate them so as to avoid
endangering public welfare.24 Therefore, soon the EPA will be required to
investigate the practicality of domestic GHG reduction measures.
Because joining Kyoto, in its current form, is politically impossible
and functionally impractical, the United States should prepare to join
Kyoto's successor.
However, the United States' refusal to join the
Kyoto Protocol has likely caused it to lose political credibility and may
weaken its ability to effectively negotiate a successor to the Kyoto
Protocol once the Protocol expires in 2012.
In order to regain its political credibility in the negotiations for the
successor to the Kyoto Protocol, the United States must show the world
that it is committed to reducing GHGs beyond the inadequate measures it
has implemented thus far.26 Additionally, the United States must come to
Cathy Cash, Investors UrgeBush, Congress to cap C0 , COAL
TRADER 3 (March 30,
2
2007); Gore's Warning on hot topic: 30 years after his first climate change hearing, he
challenges Congress again on 'planetaryemergency.' NEWSDAY A6 (March 22, 2007)
("An increasing number of companies, including General Electric Co., say they want
national carbon limits so they know how to proceed with their business plans and so they
can profit from the development of new, 'clean' technologies.").
22 Mass. v. Envtl. Prot.Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
23 Id. at 1463.
24 Id. at 1462 (holding that once a petition
for rulemaking is filed the EPA may only
avoid action in two circumstances: if it finds that "greenhouse gases do not contribute to
climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will
not exercise its discretion").
25 In June 2007, the G8 Summit will
meet to discuss the possible paths to follow beyond
the Kyoto Protocol, see infra note 128 and accompanying text.
26Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent
American Reactions to Terrorismand Climate
Change, 107 COLUMBIA L.R. 503, 509, 514 (2007) [hereinafter DivergentAmerican
Reaction]. "In terms of legal mandates, the U.S. government has done close to nothing to
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases.. .[In fact] such emissions have been increasing
in the United States." Between 1990 and 2004, carbon emissions increased 19% within
the United States. Id. at 514.
21
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the negotiations with a treaty option for GHG abatement that will address
Kyoto's weaknesses and build on Kyoto's strengths.
The specific mechanism proposed in this paper would be for the
United States to negotiate a series of bilateral treaties with the Least
Developed Countries ("LDCs"), 27 China and India specifically, that would
authorize the creation of a bilateral carbon fund ("BCF"), which would be
funded by both nations. The BCF can then be used as seed monies to fund
emission reducing developmental projects with grants in the LDCs or as
concession loans for entities in the United States. The projects that the
seed monies can fund would be similar to those projects that are
anticipated to qualify as Clean Development Mechanisms ("CDM")28
under the Kyoto Protocol, but with less administrative red-tape.
There are several benefits that initiating a BCF would create. First,
it would get both the United States and LDCs to commit to reducing
GHGs, a commitment that neither have under the Kyoto Protocol.
Second, it would curb the demand for carbon while funding projects to
reduce the supply of carbon. Third, it will build the international
credibility of the United States so that it will be able to effectively
negotiate with the international community during the process of
developing the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, it is a flexible
process that can be easily integrated with a nation's international
obligations when the successor to the Kyoto Protocol is finalized.
II. WORLD RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

A. The FrameworkConvention on Climate Change
Recognizing that climate change is likely to have significant,
adverse impacts on mankind, the United Nations organized a framework
convention to address these concerns. 29 The convention was global in
scope because of the global nature of the causes and effects of climate

See infra Parts II.D (stating that LDC's have no requirements to reduce emissions
levels under the current regulatory framework).
28 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, Art.
12.
29 FCCC, supra note
13.
27
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change.3 0 Prior to the FCCC, emission of ozone depleting substances
("ODS"), another airborne pollution problem, was dealt with in a similar
fashion. 3 Initially, there was a framework convention for consensus
building and setting out broad policy goals. Thereafter, subsequent
Conferences of Parties ("COP"), envisioned from the inception of the
framework conventions, are used to develop protocols to iron out the
specific methods of achieving and implementing the goals and policies set
forth by the framework convention. 32
The FCCC followed this formula. The FCCC set forth only a few
solid requirements on the part of the ratifying countries but outlined
several key aspects of climate change that should be addressed. 3 The
firm commitments of the FCCC parties included a requirement for nations
to develop a national inventory system for emissions accounting, a
requirement for the developed countries to share technology with the
LDCs, and a requirement to promote and fund further research on impacts
and control measures of climate change. 34 The remaining commitments
were merely aspirations to promote emission stabilization, taking into
account socio-economic mitigating factors.35 Despite not having many
firm commitments, the framework convention clearly identified that
scientific uncertainty was not a reason to delay implementation of control
30

Id. Carbon dioxide, the major contributing gas to global warming
is a very mobile gas
once it is in the atmosphere and does not tend to have localized impacts like many other
types of polluting gases. For instance, mercury is a heavier gas and tends to have the
most severe negative environmental impact on a very localized area, usually around a ten
to twenty mile radius surrounding the emitting source. P. Chu & D.B. Porcella, Mercury
Stack Emissionsfrom U.S. Electric Utility Power Plants, 80 WATER, AIR, AND SOIL
POLLUTION 135 (1995). Gases like sulfur dioxide, the major contribution pollutant to
what is commonly known as acid rain, are more mobile than mercury and can have a
regional impact, sometimes spanning its impact over several states; however, this impact
does not reach the same global scope as carbon dioxide. James A. Lynch et al., Trends in
precipitationchemistry in the UnitedStates: a nationalperspective,29 ATMOSPHERIC
ENVIRONMENT 1231 (1995).
31 Jutta Brunnie, The United States andInternational
EnvironmentalLaw: Living with an
Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 617, 636-637 (2004).
32 See Id.
3 See FCCC,

supra note 13, Art. 3.

34 Id. Art. 3 and 4.
3

s Id. Art. 4.
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measures when the "threats of serious or irreversible damage" could
occur.36
Though the academic impact of the FCCC was monumental, actual
emission reductions were not very forthcoming.3 7
With no hard
requirements or targets to reduce emissions, developed nations have
adopted only weak regulatory regimes to reduce domestic GHG
emissions.38 During the first COP in April 1995, this inadequacy was
noted and it was proposed that strengthening the commitments of the
developed nations was necessary. 3 9 Two years later, the COP met in
Kyoto, Japan to negotiate such commitments.
B. The Kyoto Protocol
1. Overview of the Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol set out specific GHG emission targets for
nations to achieve.4 0
Annex I nations from the FCCC, which
encompassed the developed nations, 4 1 agreed to make a firm commitment
to reduce GHG emissions. 42 Annex II nations from the FCCC, which
encompassed the LDCs and some nations making the transition to a

36

Id. Art. 3,

3. Because of the United States' sluggish response to implement a
comprehensive climate change regulations for various reasons including, interalia, lack
of scientific understanding of climate change. See Mass. v. Envtl. Prot.Agency, No. 051120 (U.S. April 2, 2007), the United States might, in fact, be in violation of its
obligations under the FCCC.
37
See generally Rajamani, supra note 14.
38 See Id. It is important to note that this should not be construed as a weakness of the
convention because the very nature of the convention was to merely set up a framework
to being the world-wide response to climate change. See Brunnde, supra note 31, at 63637. With such an enormous topic with varying objectives among the nations, the
framework convention was designed as a consensus building document, a stepping stone
to build a finer regulatory scheme through the COPs. Id.
39
See U.N. FCCC, 3rd Sess., Decision 1 at 4, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/Add.1 (March
25,
40 1998), availableat http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, Annex B.
41FCCC, supra note 13, Annex
1.
42 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, Art. 3.
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market economy,43 agreed to the broad principles of the Protocol but were
not charged with a commitment to achieve any emissions target.4
The emissions reduction commitments for Annex I nations were
enumerated in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 45 The nations agreed to
stabilize emissions to a certain percentage of their emissions from 1990,
the base year.46 Many of the nations agreed to a five to ten percent
reduction in the emissions from what was emitted in 1990.47 The targets
were not based on any scientific understanding of the required reduction
of GHG emissions needed to avoid, abate, or delay climate change. 48
Rather, the targets were established through the "usual give-and-take of an
intergovernmental negotiation process." 49 The general approach is that a
Party will propose a target for itself, and subsequently try to convince
other Parties that it is a reasonable and fair level in light of the principles
of the Climate Convention, the unique circumstances of the Party, and the
pledged targets of other countries." 50
2. The Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms

FCCC, supra note 13, Annex II.
4 See generally Kyoto Protocol, supranote 17, Annex B.
45
Id., Art. 3.7.
43

46

47

d

Id., Art. 3(1). The emissions are to be calculated as an average over the "commitment
eriod," which is between 2008 and 2012. Id.
Although the emissions levels were not based on scientific understanding, the Protocol
was consistent with the call of the FCCC, which provided the initial goal of stabilizing
emissions. FCCC, supra note 13, Art.2. As discussed, infra II.C, the United States, in
part, rested its basis not to join Kyoto because the actual impact on climate by reducing
emissions to the Kyoto Protocol standards was unknown or minimal, at best. However,
due to the uncertainty that existed on the ability for nations to actually stabilize emissions
at any level, the standards from the Protocol should be lauded, not criticized. The Annex
I nations were risking a great deal by agreeing to specific emissions targets without
actually knowing precisely if it was possible to achieve those targets. Granted, as
discussed infra II.B.2, there were several "safety valves" for nations to implement in the
event that the commitment was not possible to achieve.
49
Baumert, supra note 16 at 401 (citing MICHAEL GRUBB, ET AL., THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND AsSESSMENT (1999)).
50
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Despite the firm commitment to reduce emissions to a certain
percentage of the base year, the Kyoto Protocol built in several safety
values for countries to utilize if the emissions target was unachievable by
simply reducing domestic emission levels. These mechanisms are joint
implementation ("JI"),5 1 CDM,52 carbon sinks,5 3 and provisions for
emissions trading.5 4
JI acts as a mechanism to allow nations to work within a regional
framework to jointly reduce GHG emissions. Using the regional
framework allows the nations to utilize economic integration among them
cooperatively to attain an emissions level equal to the sum of their
emissions in the aggregate.55 Although similar to emission trading, JI is
not exactly emission trading as so much it is emission sharing. For
instance, with joint implementation, the nation most able to afford to
reduce its emissions will do so with the projects being funded jointly by
the participating nations. 56 With emission trading, by contrast, the nation
that can effectively reduce its emissions below its target can then sell those
excess reductions to a country that cannot reduce its emissions as
effectively.
The CDM acts as a safety valve for Annex I nations that are unable
to reach the emission target by allowing them to apply emission reductions
created through a project implemented in an Annex II nation.57 The
purpose of the CDM is two-fold: (1) to encourage developed countries to
fund projects that create sustainable development in an LDC and (2) to
encourage LDCs to take measures to reduce emissions despite no
obligation to do so under the Protocol. 8 To qualify as a CDM, an Annex
I nation must fund a project in an Annex II nation that results in a "real,
measurable, and long-term" reduction in the Annex II nation's carbon
emissions that would not have resulted absent the CDM.5 9
51Kyoto

Protocol, supra note 17, Art. 4.
Id., Art. 12.
" Id., Art. 6.1(b).
54 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, Art. 12.
5 See Id., Art. 4.
52

56id.

"Id., Art. 12.
58
Id.
59 Id.
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The Kyoto Protocol also provided for nations to apply the carbon
stored in carbon sinks as a reduction to the nation's total emissions.so A
carbon sink is "any process, activity or mechanism which removes a
GHG, aerosols, or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere" 6 1
and stores the gas in a reservoir. A "reservoir" is the component in which
the GHG is stored.6 2 Accordingly, reforestation would be a sink while a
forest would be a reservoir. 6 3 The enhancement of sinks was viewed as a
positive net benefit because it resulted in the permanent or long-term
removal of carbon from the atmosphere and storing it in a way such that it
would not contribute to the atmospheric levels of carbon. Additionally,
the enhancement of sinks, like reforesting areas that had been clearcut, has
economic, ecological, 65 and environmental benefitS66 that extend beyond
the removal of carbon from the atmosphere.
During the negotiations in Kyoto, the United States pushed for the
adoption of a framework to permit emissions trading among the nations as
a means for nations to meet obligations under the treaty.67 Unwilling to
60

Id, Art. 6.1(b). Under the FCCC, nations were required to develop a methodology to
calculate the net loss from removal of sinks and the net gain from the enhancement of
sinks. FCCC, supra note 13, at Art. IV (1).
61Brendan P. McGivem, Introduction, Conference of the Parties
to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol,37 I.L.M. 22, 23 n.4 (1998).
62 Id. at Art. 1
(7).
63 Sequestering carbon in geological formations, like in caves or
the ocean, is also another
example of a sink. Alexander Gillespie, Sinks and the Climate Change Regime: The
State ofPlay, 13 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 279, 280 (2003).
6 Forest production is a large sector of agricultural production in LDCs. Gopa Joshi,
Forest and ForestPolicy in India, 11 SOCIAL SCIENTIST 43 (1983).
65 Forests and wetlands play an important role in providing suitable habitat for threatened
and endangered species. Derald J. Hay, When Sealing the Leaks ofHabitat Conservation
Banking, Multiple Gaskets areNeeded. The Casefor Bog Turtle in Pennsylvania, 14
PENN ST. ENVTL. L.REv. 299, 310 (2006).
66 Maintaining consistent vegetative cover prevents erosion. David Pimental & Nadia
Kounang, Ecology ofSoil Erosion in Ecosystems, 1 ECOSYSTEMS 416 (1998).
Maintaining ecosystem also prevents floods. Manuel C. Molles, Jr., et al., Managed
Floodingfor RiparianEcosystem Restoration, 48 BIOSCIENCE 749 (1998), and non-point
source pollution, from directly entering the water system, W. L. Miller & H. W. Everett,
The Economic Impact of Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution in Hardwood
Forestland, 57 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 576 (1975).
67 Emily Richman, Emissions Trading and the Development Critique:Exposing the Treat
to Developing Countries, 36 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L.& POL. 133, 132, 138, 148, 158 (2003).
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specifically adopt a framework at the time, the Kyoto Protocol merely
contemplated a trading regime, with the establishment of the actual system
to be ironed out in a subsequent COP.68
C. The United States' Response to Kyoto
1. Political Response to Kyoto
The United States was a signatory nation to the Kyoto Protocol.
After the protocol was signed, it was sent back to the signatory nations for
ratification. President Clinton prepared to ratify the treaty and bring it
before the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 69 Before the
President could even submit the treaty to the Senate, however, the Senate
passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution which offered the Senate's advice to the
President regarding the treaty. 70 In the resolution, which passed with
overwhelming bipartisan support, the Senate advised the President that the
United States should not be a signatory to any treaty that would,
"(1) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from Annex I Parties, unless the
Protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from Developing Country Parties within the
same compliance period, or (2) would result in serious
harm to the economy of the United States." 7 '

68 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, at Art. 21.
69

U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President has the power to make treaties with the
advice and consent of a two-third majority of the Senate. Id. Although some types of
treaties can be made without the advice and consent of the Senate such as congressionalexecutive or sole executive agreements, the United States has traditionally joined treaties
involving environmental subjects via the Senate advice and consent process. David A.
Wirth, The President,the Environment, and ForeignPolicy: The Globalization of
EnvironmentalPolitics,24 J. ENVTL L. 393, 402 (2004).
70
See Byrd-Hagel Res., 143 Cong. Rec. S8113, S8115, S8138 (1997).
71 Id. at S8138-39.

503

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 15, No. 3
Although the Senate did not specify exactly what it would deem to
be an appropriate commitment from LDCs, it was apparent that any
altruism that existed during the FCCC had eroded in the face of the stark
reality of reducing GHG emissions.
Furthermore, Congress prevented the executive branch from
enacting GHG regulations pursuant to the EPA's authority under the Clean
Air Act by attaching budget riders barring the use of any of the EPA's
budget to implement or prepare to implement the commitments from the
Kyoto Protocol.7 2
Failing to garner enough support for the treaty, President Clinton
never brought the Kyoto Protocol before the Senate for ratification.
President George W. Bush was elected to office after President Clinton. 73
Within months of entering office, President Bush announced that he would
not bring the treaty before the Senate for ratification either. Eventually,
President Bush proclaimed that the Kyoto Protocol was "fatally flawed"
and that the United States did not intend to ratify the treaty. 74 President
Bush cited three reasons for the administration's view that Kyoto was a
failure: (1) scientific uncertainty regarding the threat of climate change,7 5
(2) lack of commitments from LDCs, and (3) arbitrary, unscientific
emission targets that would harm the United States' economy. 76
2. The Ethical Obligations of the United States
"Humans have rights to life, liberty and personal security that
create duties in others to refrain from interference with these basic

Diener, supra note 19, at 2105-06.
7 Jack M. Beermann, PresidentialPowers in Transitions,
83 B.U. L. REv. 947, 948
(2003).
74 See Remarks on Global Climate Change, 1 Pub. Papers 634 (June 11, 2001). Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this action might be considered to be the
United States effectively withdrawing its signature from the treaty, thereby relieving it
from the obligation to not "defeat the object and purpose of the treaty." See VCLT, supra
note 20, Art. XVIII.
7 See supra note 36.
76 Diener, supra note
19, at 2106.
72
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rights."7
Climate change has already infringed on these rights on the
people in the poorest of nations. 78 Therefore, others have a duty to
implement precautionary measures to prevent further interference with
these basic rights. 79 Evaluating what 'duties' an actor has and what an
actor 'should do' is an ethical question with an answer based on
morality.8 0
Ethics, as a general field of study, "involves all systematic efforts
to understand and to resolve moral problems that arise in some domain of
practical life." 8 ' Moral problems focus on the evaluation of values - "a
body of 'accepted' conduct." 82 Morality contemplates things that
"should" be done in terms of an actor's conduct.8 3 Then, relating back to
the field of ethics, "[e]thics must inquire into what the 'should' or the
'ought' of morality means. 84 When dealing with environmental issues like
climate change, ethical consideration are, "concerned with our relations
and obligations to future generations, to nonhuman animals and species,
and to ecosystems and the biosphere as a whole."85 Because of the
potentially catastrophic impacts of climate change,8 6 "constraints of
carbon emissions [are] ethically obligatory, despite the interests to the
contrary of energy-producing countries and corporations." 8 7
77

DONALD BROWN, ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 10 (2006), availableat http://rockethics.psu.edu/climate/whitepaper/edccwhitepaper.pdf [hereinafterETHICAL DIMENSIONS].

Id at 9.

7

9

Id. at 13-14.
so Donald Brown, The Importanceof Expressly Examining Global Warming Policy Issues
through an EthicalPrism, 12 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 147 (2004) [hereinafter Ethical
Prism] (noting that the response of the United States to this ethical question has been
clouded with reasoning not based on morality, but rather economics and scientific
uncertainty. Neither of these reasons are supported by an ethical argument).
81Earl R. Winkler, Applied Ethics, Overview, 1 RUTH CHADWICK, ED., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
APPLIED ETHICS 191, 192 (Ruth Chadwick ed. 1998).
82 Harold N. Lee, Morals, Morality, and Ethics: Suggested Terminology, 38 INT'L J.
ETHICS 450, 451, 453 (1928).
83
Id. at 454.
8 Id. at 462.
85 Winkler, supra note 81
at 192.
86 See
87

supra, notes 2-12 and accompanying text.

Robin Attfield, EnvironmentalEthics, Overview, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS
73, 81 (Ruth Chadwick ed. 1998).
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Due to the principle of distributional fairness, it is the ethical
obligation of the developed nations to constrain carbon emissions.
Distributional fairness is a principle that weighs the equities of those who
have contributed the most to climate change, those who are most affected
by climate change, those who are in the best position to adapt technology
to combat climate change, and those who are in the best position to
weather the impacts of climate change. 8 8
The United States is one of the four highest GHGs emitters in the
world. It has been emitting significant amounts of GHGs since the advent
of the industrial revolution. As a highly industrial nation, it has and
continues to emit large quantities of GHGs into the atmosphere. Given the
scientific link of GHGs to climate change and the persistent nature of
GHGs in the atmosphere, it follows that the United States and other
"developed nations are mostly responsible for the build up of GHGs in the
atmosphere to present levels although total emissions and per capita
emissions levels vary greatly among nations." 89
Although the IPCC has detailed that the impacts of climate change
will be spread globally, climate change will have a differentiated impact
on various regions. 90 "Many of those who will be most harmed by climate
change have contributed little to causing the problem." 9 ' Furthermore,
"those that are most vulnerable to climate change are often least able to
pay for adaptation measures needed to protect them from climate change
impacts." 9 2 Therefore, LDCs will be unable to implement programs for
irrigation in the case of drought, dikes in the event of flooding, or HVAC
systems to prevent heat stoke.
Conversely, the United States and other developed nations "who
emit the most GHGs are least threatened by adverse climate change
impacts." 93 Additionally, the United States has the ability to domestically

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 77 at 11.
Id. at 11.
90
See supra Part II.A; see also FCCC, supra note 13.
9' ETHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 77, at 10.
92 d
8

9

93

id.
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adapt to any of the impacts of climate change. It has the financial
resources and infrastructures to respond to national disasters. 94
Finally, the United States, as an industrial nation with
technological expertise, is in a better position than LDCs to develop new
mechanisms and energies that do not result in carbon emissions.
Implementation
and reduction
of carbon emissions
would
disproportionately affect LDCs than the United States because the citizens
of LDCs spend a higher percentage of income on energy than the citizens
of the United States. 95 LDCs "cannot justly be expected to curtail carbon
emissions until they are able to satisfy the basic needs of their citizens." 96
Thus, cycling back to the beginning of the discussion on ethics - because
each human has a fundamental right to life, liberty, and personal security,
policies to combat climate change should be addressed. Specifically, the
United States has an ethical obligation because of its contribution to the
problem and its ability to absorb the impacts and costs of reduction
measures.
D. Commentary on Kyoto
"Like a Rorschach test, reactions to the Kyoto Protocol generally
reveal more about the speaker than about the protocol."9 Regardless of
one's view of the protocol, it cannot be argued that it does not represent an
environmental agreement of unprecedented import. It addressed an issue
of immense magnitude at the time of muddied scientific waters. When the
agreement was negotiated, there was a great deal of uncertainty
surrounding the impacts of climate change, the emissions levels (if any)
94 Although

the implementation of the federal government's response to disasters like
Katrina were highly criticized, it still maintains the resources necessary for an effective
response. Scott Canon, Emergency Officials Across U.S. Say They Have Enough
Manpower to Respond ifAnother DisasterStrikes, KANSAS CITY STAR at A9 (Sept. 15,
2005).
9 Mark A. Drumble, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in InternationalEnvironmental
Law, 76 TUL. L.REv. 843, 849 (2002).
96 Attfield, supra note 87, at 81.
9 Daniel Bodansky, US. Climate Policy After Kyoto: Elements for Success, 1 (Carnegie
Endowment 2002), availableat
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybriefl 5.pdf.
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that would prevent or mitigate these impacts, and the possibility of the
world's ability to ratchet down its emissions while maintaining a viable
economy.
When examining the Kyoto Protocol, it is important to view it
through the perspective that the Protocol was just merely the first step the
world took toward addressing the kaleidoscope of issues surrounding
climate change. What flows from that premise is that the Protocol was not
specifically aimed at stopping the adverse effects of climate change, but
merely aimed at assessing the world's ability to adjust the industrial
processes for using cleaner fuels.

Necessity spurs innovation.

The

Protocol was the mechanism designed to spur the creation of innovative,
efficient and economical technology. Millions of dollars have been spent
to develop better technology and the benefits are real and tangible.
Biofuels are finally a reality. 98 Landfills are trapping and using the
methane gas generated through the decomposition process. 99 Solar and

wind energies are now more available to consumers. 100
Not only did the Kyoto Protocol create the necessity to use cleaner
energy,

but consumers are also shaping

the future

of industrial

development. In a market economy, sometimes consumers can be a
greater driving force of change than the government.' 0
The Kyoto
Protocol opened discussions about climate change and helped bring the
data of climate change to the general populace.' 02 If consumers are
willing to pay the extra costs of providing cleaner energy, then industry
will be more than willing to supply the energy.
Beth Evans, Chevron: Climate Tougherfor US Refiners, 85 PLAts OILGRAM PRICE
REP. 1 (March 22, 2007).
9 Ad Crable, Waste Authority Laudedfor Methane Program,LANCASTER NEW ERA (Jan.
9

23, 2007).
'" Pedro Arrais, More Power to You: Alternative Energy Systems Can Save You and the
Environment, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS at F6 (April 1, 2007).

10 Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal andKyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENvTL.

L. REv. 1, 11 (2007) [hereinafter A Tale of Two Protocols] (noting that America
responded to warning of Ozone depletion by "cutting their demand for aerosol sprays by

more than half, thus dramatically affecting the market.")
102 For some reason, it took American consumers a little longer
to catch up to the rest of
the world in terms of changing their attitude toward climate change. It was not by
coincidence that there was a noticeable shift in the American attitude after former Vice
President Al Gore released his documentary movie, "An Inconvenient Truth."
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Although the Kyoto Protocol has provided benefits, it also has
some weaknesses. Perhaps one of the most criticized aspects of the
Protocol is that it will be too costly for nations to comply with their
obligations. The United States has continuously claimed that its industry
relies on emitting carbon dioxide and that the cost of retrofitting these
outfits would significantly outweigh any benefits that would be realized
from reducing emissions.10 3
Another issue about Kyoto that has received a great deal of
criticism is the targets the nations agreed upon. The criticisms suggest
that the targets were arbitrarily selected, that the targets are not likely to
achieve any permanent impact on climate change,104 and that many
nations will not even be able to achieve their agreed upon targets.105
News reports have spelled out a cynical view of the ability of many
nations to reduce their emissions to the Kyoto Targets. Some of the most
notable nations that have not nor will meet their obligations under the
Protocol include Canadal 06 and Ireland. 0 7
Another weakness of the Protocol is the possibility that the total
global emissions of GHGs may actually be higher after the first
commitment period than were the emissions during the negotiations of the
Protocol. 108 This is partially a result of the fact that some Annex I nations
will not be able to achieve their target. However, the most significant
reason for the increase in global emissions stems from the fact that LDCs
But see Diener,supra note 19, at 2090 ("A relatively small investment today is far
wiser than spending vast amounts in the future to restore ecosystems, agriculture, and
infrastructure... [T]he time to act on carbon is now.") (quoting Senator Daniel K Akaka,
Hawaii Democrat, Brian DeBose and Bill Sammon, Global-Warming Limits Rejected,
WASH. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at Al).
104 Remarks on Global Climate Change, 1 Pub. Papers 634 (June 11, 2001).
'0 Eben Harrell, Rich NationsFailing to Cut Greenhouse Gases, SCOTSMAN, June 3,
2006, at 14.
106 Martin Mittelstaet, Environmentalists Threaten to Launch Legal Challenge, GLOBE
AND MAIL, Nov. 1, 2006, at A7.
107 Gene McKenna, IrelandRapped Over Failingto Keep Kyoto Target, IRISH
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 30, 2006, availableat http://www.independent.ie/nationalnews/Ireland-rapped-over-failing-to-keep-kyoto-target-75837.html.
108Bryan Walsh, The Impact ofAsia's Giants: How China andIndia CouldSave the
Planet--orDestroy It, TIME, Apr. 3, 2006, at 61, availableat
http://www.e2.org/ext/doc/Time%2Impact%2Oof%~o2OAsia%20Giants.pdf
1o3
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have no requirements to reduce emissions at all. LDCs have increased
energy consumption through the process of development, and that
development has not been implemented with GHG reduction targets in
mind.
As companies from developed nations outsource to nations like
China and India, the industries in the LDCs grow and continue to use the
energy that they would have in the developed nations. Therefore,
although there will be a reduction of emissions domestically for the Annex
I nation, the net global emissions will not be changed, just moved to an
LDC. The Bush administration has cited this fact as a large reason for its
reservation and subsequent withdrawal from the treaty.109 Countries such
as India and China are quickly industrializing and have GHG emission
levels growing at rates faster than any other nation.1lo However, one
reason that LDCs were not obligated to any commitments, like they were
in the Montreal Protocol, was because further Protocols, which would
bring in the LDCs, were anticipated once the Kyoto Protocol expired."'
Altruism aside, the Kyoto Protocol's lack of commitments from
LDCs is a serious weakness.
However, given the timing of the
negotiations, it was unlikely that any LDC would have joined a treaty that
imposed any serious commitment that would compromise its economic
development. 112 Thus, although the lack of a commitment from LDCs
during the first commitment period is a weakness, the Kyoto Protocol is
just a starting point. With the successor to Kyoto looming in the future, it
is possible that the world will demand commitments from LDCs;
furthermore, LDCs may be willing to agree to commitments if the
countries can receive a firm commitment of economic support to
achieving those emission reductions.
The trading mechanism of Kyoto has also received its fair share of
criticism. With the base year of 1990, several nations could realize a
windfall from the trading ratio without even instituting any reduction
10

Remarks on Global Climate Change, 1 Pub. Papers 634, 635 (June 11, 2001).

110 Walsh, supra note 108, at 61.

11 A Tale of Two Protocols,supra note 101.
112 "If the wealthy nations have no general obligation
to help the poor, then the poor
certainly have no general obligation to help the wealthy. International environmental law
is, and will remain, as concerned with economic development as with protecting the
environment." Drumble, supra note 95, at 845.
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measures. For instance, Russia suffered from an economic and industrial
collapse in the years after 1990 when the Soviet Union disbanded." 3 This
collapse resulted in a dramatic reduction in its carbon emissions. 1 14
Therefore, it will have the ability to use the happenstance of the economic
collapse as currency to trade with European nations that are unable to
reach their targets. 115 Depending on the total supply and demand of the
credits, it is possible that it would be cheaper for the other European
countries to purchase those credits than instituting domestic emissions
reduction standards.116 Therefore, the Soviet Union and the other
European countries which trade with the Soviet Union will be technically
in compliance with the treaty without actually reducing emissions.
Finally, the CDM has also been criticized for its low participation
rate, administrative hula-hoops, high transaction costs, and low emission
reduction capacity.'" 7 As of August 2008, there were only 125 currently
open CDM projections. 18 For a project to be approved as a CDM, the
project must be proven to be "additional" to what would have occurred
absent the CDM mechanism. Additionally, the project cannot use funds
diverted from other money sources that are used for developmental
assistance."l 9 Congruent with the administrative hula-hoops is the high
transaction cost of getting a project approved by the CDM Executive
Board.120 Finally, Baumert reported that the mid-range estimate for
possible emissions reduction from CDM only amounted to one and a half
percent of a LDC's emissions level.121
113 Cory

C. Miller, Developments in Climate Change: Three Cheersfor Russia, 2004
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 143, note 26 (2004).
114

d.

115 Bruce

Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers,Baptists,and the Global Warming Battle,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 177, 223 (2002).
"16 id.
117 Baumert, supra note 16, at 387-88.
118See UNFCCC, CDM: Validation,
at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/Validation/index.html (last visited August 3, 2008).
119 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, at Art. 12.
120Baumert, supra note 16, at 388 (noting that one of the purposes of the CDM was
to
allow the Annex I nations to find more cost effective ways of achieving the emissions
targets by funding projects in the developing world; however, this purpose is thwarted if
the administrative costs make the project prohibitively expensive).
121 Id.
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Admittedly, the Kyoto Protocol is not the answer to climate
change. It was never touted as the answer to climate change - just a step
toward the answer. Many nations are skeptical of the effectiveness
emissions reductions will have on the effects of climate change. Because
the magnitude of the environmental impacts1 22 and economic viability of
reducing or stabilizing emissions will vary widely from nation to nation,
each nation has a different agenda going into negotiations. These agenda
gaps can make consensus building difficult. It is possible that the next
step to finding an answer to climate change is not necessarily on a global
scale, but rather on a regional scale. Maybe a break from the traditional
Multilateral Environmental Agreement ("MEA")123 framework will help
bring the agendas of the different nations closer together for a more
effective global response in the future.
Currently, the international perspective is that a global initiative is
necessary for a climate change plan of action, but any such plan of action
will be inadequate without the participation of the United States since it is
one of the largest emitters of GHGs. However, despite the fact that the
United States will not join Kyoto, there is another mechanism for the
United States to join in the plan of action. Joining the successor to Kyoto
is an option for the United States to join the global plan of action;
however, the United States, in its unique position, may be able to
implement its own plan of action without being bound by the constraints
of Kyoto. Kyoto has its flaws,124 many of which the United States was
quick to point out. The United States should use its acute knowledge of
the shortfalls of Kyoto to build its own plan of action and contribute to the
global effort. One such method would be to engage in bilateral
discussions with individual LDCs for emission reduction co-commitments.
This would build on Kyoto and offer the flexibility that the United States
The United Nations recently released a report detailing scientists'
best estimates of the
environmental impact of a few degrees increase in temperature. Alan Zarembo &
Thomas H. Maugh, Climate Report by U.N. Paints Grim View, PITrSBURGH-POST
GAZETTE , Apr. 7, 2007, at Al. For a concise but detailed account of the environmental
impacts of climate changes, see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change2007: Climate ChangeImpacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (2007) (prepared
by Neil Adger et al.), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.
123 See Brunnie, supra note
31, at 637-38.
124 See discussion supra,
section II.E.
122
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needs to engage in a climate change plan of action without necessarily
committing itself to any onerous obligations under a MEA.
For an effective response to climate change, a unified global
response is necessary because of the prevalence of GHGs in the
atmosphere, the transportability of GHGs throughout the world, and the
wide distribution of emissions globally. In order to get a global response,
the United States will need to join the international response in the
successor to Kyoto.125 For the United States to have credibility when
negotiating the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, it must take action now.
Developing a new strategy to help combat climate change outside of the
framework of the Kyoto Protocol may provide the United States with the
opportunity to build its credibility, prepare for compulsory emission
reduction domestically,' 26 and maintain complete control of its initial
international response to climate change.
III. SUCCESSOR TO KYOTO

The G8 summit 27 met in June 2007 with a major focus on opening
discussions on the successor to Kyoto.128 For the successor to Kyoto to
enjoy greater effectiveness than the Protocol, the United States will need
to join the agreement.129 Being one of the top four emitters of GHGs, 130
While the United States could opt to only combat climate change domestically, it
would likely benefit from joining the international response if there was a carbon market
because it would aid the industries to find the most cost effective ways of achieving
regulatory obligations. Chances are that eventually the United States will need to join the
international response. It would be in a better position to join the response sooner rather
then later because the cost of compliance will only escalate the longer it takes to respond.
126 Compulsory emission reductions seem inevitable after the Supreme Court's decision
in Mass. v. Envtl. Prot.Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007).
127 The G8, or "Group of 8," is a group of the eight largest industrialized nations which
"meet annually to discuss major economic and political issues." Group ofEight,
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/economic-issues/groupof_8.html.
128
Blair Wants New Climate Change Deal Before Stepping Down, 156 POWER UK at 18
(February 27, 2007).
129 U.S. Disagrees at G8 Climate Meeting, KANSAS CITY STAR, March 19, 2007 ("A
successor agreement to Kyoto to reduce emissions beyond 2012 would be 'pretty much
meaningless without the U.S.,') (quoting the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer).
125
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the United States has the ability to significantly curtail global carbon
emissions. Being a major economic force, the United States has the ability
to positively influence the market for carbon trading.' 3'
However, the United States never ratified the Kyoto Protocol.' 3 2
The Bush administration has made it clear that there is no chance that the
United States will join Kyoto during its term.' 33 President Bush's term
ends in 2008, which is the beginning of the first commitment period of
Kyoto and joining Kyoto would not be practical because of the timeline
for achieving emissions reductions through the commitment periods.1 34
The world needs the United States to agree to a GHG emissions
target; however, the United States does not appear to be ready to make any
considerable concessions that it views as likely to economically impair its
industry. This conflict creates an impasse. If the United States does not
get what it wants, it is not likely to join Kyoto's successor either.135 At
the same time, in order for the United States to be able to join in and
contribute to the negotiations of the successor to Kyoto, it will need to
Alister Doyle, UN Calls for Special Summit on Climate Change, IRISH TIMEs at
15
(March 22, 2007). China, Russia, and India are the other three top carbon emitting
nations. Id.
131Baumert, supra note 16, at 386 ("The market demand for CDM credits and other
'Kyoto units' shrank by an estimated 70 percent with the withdrawal of the United States
from the Kyoto treaty.").
132 U.S. Disagreesat G8 Climate Meeting, KANSAS CITY STAR, March 19, 2007 (noting
the EPA's resistance at the meeting to the European carbon markets and the United
States' efforts to regulate GHG "intensity targets").
133Diener, supra note 19, at 2106.
134
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, at Art. 3. The commitment period requires the Annex
I nations to average their carbon emissions between 2008-2012. Id. Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 17, at Art. 3. Even if the newly elected president submitted the treaty to the
Senate on the first day of office, the Senate would file it for debate, upon which a twothirds majority would be required. David A. Wirth, The President,the Environment,and
ForeignPolicy: The GlobalizationofEnvironmentalPolitics, 24 J. ENVTL L. 393, 402
(2004). Even if the Senate consented in a timely fashion, implementing legislation would
be needed because the treaty is not self-executing. Once implementing legislation was in
place, industry would need time to adjust to the new legislation. With only voluntary
measures at this point, implementing the drastic compulsory measures that would be
necessary for the United States to achieve its target would inevitably lead to failure in the
short timeframe remaining.
135 History is bound to repeat
itself.
130
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develop a viable option that would both be acceptable to the United States
and result in appreciable GHG reductions. If the United States is unable to
build its credibility, it will be unlikely to influence the drafting of the
successor to Kyoto.
If the United States eventually moves forward with the global
effort, there are significant costs for the United States of not taking early
action. The first cost is the inability to capture the "low hanging fruit."
The low hanging fruits are the projects that are the most cost-effective
means of reducing GHG emissions - measures that reduce high levels of
emissions with relatively low costs. Such measures may include using the
CDM in a LDC, paying for emissions credits when the supply is high and
the demand is low, or taking early actions to reduce emissions
domestically before further incompatible infrastructure is built. Being the
first nation to act means that all of the options will be at the disposal of the
decision makers. The decision makers will be able to select the most costeffective measures. However, if the United States waits to take action,
other Annex I nations will take the early actions and get credit for the
reduced emissions.13 6 When the United States eventually regulates
GHGs,1 37 the most cost effective options will have already been
completed; thus, leaving the United States, as a late actor, with more
expensive measures to take to reduce the equivalent amount of emissions.
The second cost of not taking early action is that it becomes more
difficult for industry to capitalize and budget for large expenditures to
retrofit facilities to reduce carbon emissions. If early actions are taken,
then the implementation of compulsory measures can be phased in such a
way as to offer industry the opportunity to adjust and budget for large
capital expenses. It will give industry a more predictable future. For
instance, General Motors and other large industrial companies within the
United States have actually requested GHG regulation to assist the
planning of future developments within the companies. Industry does not
Although other Annex I nations have already begun implementing the projects that
would constitute the "low hanging fruit," there still remains many options to pursue. Eric
Shafffier, Repudiation andRegret: Is the United States Sitting Out the Kyoto Protocolto
its Economic Detriment?, 37 ENVTL L. 441, passim (2007). However, there will be fewer
and fewer options as the United States continues to wait to join the response efforts. Id.
137 Regulation seems imminent due to the decision in Mass. v. Envtl. Prot.Agency, 127
S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
136
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want to invest in improvements today if it will be required to meet more
stringent regulations in the near future. Certainty will give industry the
ability to move forward and early action gives industry the ability to adapt
at cheaper costs and capitalize over a longer period of time.
Not only does early action reduce the cost of adjusting to climate
change, it can also be used as political currency. The early action will
result in actual, definable, measurable steps to prove to the world that the
United States is willing to respond to climate change. It will increase the
United States' credibility in the international community, which will be
the necessary currency for the United States to utilize during further
international negotiations on climate change. The world will listen and be
more receptive to the United States' agenda if the United States takes
these early actions. Absent the United States taking real, definable
actions,' 3 8 the world may move in a direction inconsistent with the United
States' agenda. This will possibly lead to the United States refusing to
join the global climate change initiative again.
The repercussions of the United States failing to join the global
initiative could be more prevalent in the future than it was when it failed to
join Kyoto. Many Europeans view climate change as one of the world's
largest threats moving into the future, even greater than the AIDS
epidemic, poverty, natural disasters, and famine.' 39 If the impacts of
climate change continue to progress and become realized, the fallout of the
global opinion of the United States could get worse than it already is now.
Given that early action can reduce future compliance costs and
increase the United States' political clout, it is in the best interests of the
United States to start implementing programs that reduce carbon
emissions, both domestically and internationally.14 0
13 Recently several bills brought before Congress for debate which address climate
change. Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., John C. Dembach & Thomas D. Peterson, Federal
Climate ChangeLegislation as If the States Matter, 22 NAT. REs. & ENvT 3, 3-4 (2008).
139 Divergent American Reaction, supra note
26, at 513.
140 The United States has made several bilateral or multilateral
agreements; however,
these agreements are mostly political commitments to develop further technology rather
than reduce carbon emissions. H. Josef Hebert, China and India Among 6 Nations to
Adopt Clean - Energy Pact, STAR-LEDGER at 6 (July 28, 2005). See also Agreement on
Agricultural Cooperation, Art. II, signed April 10, 1999, availableat
http://foia.state.gov/documents/IntAgreements/0OOCCCE.pdf (agreeing with China to
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A. Nations as laboratoriesfor the world
Climate change is a global phenomenon that is contributed to by
every nation in the world and will impact each and every one of those
nations. The Kyoto Protocol provided a first step toward a solution;
however, with such a large issue with varying levels of interests, it is not
surprising that the Kyoto Protocol was not satisfactory to every party
involved. Perhaps other avenues to reduce global emissions need to be
explored. However, taking innovative steps can be problematic with
MEAs because they commit the world toward an uncertain goal, with
uncertain costs, and uncertain benefits. Further, with more nations
involved with the process, negotiating innovative steps can be problematic
due to the relative willingness of various nations' comfort with unproven
measures.
Perhaps smaller, regional efforts exploring various innovative
mechanisms might be another way to arrive at a global approach toward
Smaller agreements could be used to
preventing climate change.
supplement and implement a nation's agreement under an MEA. An
appropriate analogy would be to the United States' federal system with
both the states and federal governments enacting a coexisting framework
of laws to address the same social policies.'41 As Justice Brandeis noted,
"[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
jointly research "measures to control greenhouse gas emissions in agriculture);
Millennium Challenge Compact, Art. 3 (b), signed September 12, 2005, availableat
http://foia.state.gov/documents/IntAgreements/0000D602.pdf (noting that GHG
emissions may be reduced with the future development projects in the nation of Georgia);
Fifth Amendatory Agreement to the Project Grant Agreement for Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Prevention Project, signed September 26, 2001, availableat
http://foia.state.gov/documents/IntAgreements/0000CBCE.pdf (committing $3,800,000
to India for a project started in 1995 to reduce GHG emissions in India).
141 Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., James McElfish, Michael Jacobson & Derald J. Hay, Legal
Tools That Provide DirectProtectionfor Elements ofBiodiversity, BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION HANDBOOK 227, 238 (2006).
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country."l42 By analogy, two nations that are courageous enough to act
alone can experiment with novel climate change policies without
committing the rest of the world to those policies. If the policy is
successful, then, the policy can be implemented internationally; however,
if the policy fails, the failure will not reverberate throughout the
international community. It is the United States' moral and ethical
obligation to act as that courageous nation because of its failure to join
Kyoto. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the United States to address
domestic carbon emissions as it is one of the largest carbon emitters in the
world. 143
The United States had two major hesitations regarding Kyoto Kyoto does not commit LDCs and compliance is too costly.'" Rather
than allowing the weakness of Kyoto to delay implementation of a
mitigation strategy, the United States could negotiate its own bilateral
agreements with the LDCs that commit them to reducing carbon emissions
while simultaneously agreeing to implement its own reduction program.
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol's first weakness would be ameliorated because it
would commit LDCs to emission reductions. Furthermore, because these
are bilateral agreements, as opposed to multilateral agreements, the United
States would be able to control how these programs are funded; thus, the
Kyoto Protocol's second weakness would be ameliorated because the
United States would be able to control the cost of the response by
controlling the level of funding.

142 New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (J. Brandis, dissenting);
see also Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems:
State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and
Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.REv. 15, 16 (2004).
143 Joshua P. Fershee, Levels of Green: State and FederalEfforts,
in Wyoming and
Beyond, to Reduce GreenhouseGas Emissions, 7 WYO. L. REV. 269, 289 (2007)
14Byrd-Hagel Resolution. The third US hesitation
was the scientific uncertainty
surrounding the impacts of climate change. The science of climate has improved and the
hypotheses have become more concrete. However, the science will never be a perfect
predictor because it will always rely on assumptions. However, under the FCCC, the
United States should be precluded from using scientific uncertainty as an excuse for
avoiding action.
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1. Developing Bilateral Instruments
Because the United States is unwilling to join Kyoto but still has
an ethical obligation to reduce carbon emissions, bilateral international
agreements are an effective way for the United States to effectuate an
international climate change strategy. With LDCs having few obligations
under Kyoto, it is possible for bilateral agreements to compliment the
Kyoto Protocol by providing additional requirements for LDCs.
The evolution of an international regime of bilateral agreements
would not be unique. For example, international investment is mostly
regulated through a web of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs").145 The
evolution of bilateral climate change treaties would likely follow the same
path as the evolution of BITs, which actually provide a fairly
comprehensive framework governing foreign investments, so much so that
commentators argue that the collage of BITs has developed into a distilled
form of customary international law.146
The rule of law governing foreign investment first evolved as
customary international law with the development of the Hull rule after
the United States brought an action on behalf of its citizens against
Mexico.14 7 The Hull rule was a general guiding principle that governed
the expropriation of foreign investments.14 8
Likewise, customary
international law has evolved in the arena of environmental law in a
similar fashion. In fact, an arbitration action brought by the United States
on behalf of its citizens
49 established the foundation of international
50
environmental law.

145Kenneth

J. Vandevelde, US. BilateralInvestment Treaties: The Second Wave
The Second Wave], 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621 (1993).
[hereinafter
146 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 130 (2003).
147 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the
Popularity
ofBilateral
Investment
Treaties,
38
Va.
J.
Int'l
L.
639,
644-45
(1998).
48
1

d

Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. (1941) 1905.
1so See Diener,supranote 19, at 628 (customary international developed as a "prohibition
against causation of significant transboundary environmental harm") (citing Principle 21,
Stockholm Declaration on the Human and Environment, reprinted in 11 ILM (1972)
149
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During the decolonization era after World War II, LDCs gained a
numerical majority in the international bodies and began undermining the
Hull rule's status as customary international law. The reason LDCs
undermined the Hull rule is because it imposed a heavy burden on them to
compensate foreign investments and the LDCs felt that they did not have a
say in shaping the rule. Initially, LDCs feared that foreign investments
would possibly interfere with their independence or lead to exploitation of
their resources. 1 5' Thus, there was a conflict between developed nations
and LDCs as to the standards of international governance of foreign
investments. In the mid-1960s, this divergence became more apparent
when the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") could not garner a consensus in its attempt to create a
multilateral treaty governing the treatment of international governance. 152
Likewise a second attempt to conclude a multilateral treaty for foreign
investment failed in the 1990s.1 53
With the absence of any comprehensive or clear view of the
international governance of foreign investments, developed nations began
implementing bilateral agreements1 54 with LDCs. '5 The United States
created its own BIT model text. 5 6 For the most part, the language in the
model text was non-negotiable.' 5 7 The language of the BITs provided for
broader protection of foreign investments than what was provided by the
1420; Principle 2, Rio Declaration on Environmental Development, reprinted in 31 ILM
(1992) 818.
"' Id. at 166. (BIT history)

Lowenfeld, supra note 146, at 123 (citing Org.for Econ. Co-operation
& Dev., Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 241 (1963)).
153 Lowenfeld, supra note 146, at 123 (citing Org. for Econ.
Co-operation & Dev.,
International Investment, Report to Ministry by Secretary General -- The Multilateral
Afreement on Investment: Why Did it Fail? (1999)).
15 The United States has entered several bilateral agreements regarding
climate change
subjects with nations such as China and India; however, none of these agreements purport
to reduce emissions in as much as they are promoting technology sharing. See supranote
140.
iss Id. at 168. The U.N. Charter prohibited the use of military force to collect debts or
protect investments in foreign nations. Id. Therefore, with the undermining of the Hull
rule, these were few requirements that could compel a nation to compensate investors if
their investments were expropriated.
156 The Second Wave, supra note 145, at 642.
157id
152
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Hull rule.' 5 8 After the fear of exploitation ebbed, LDCs responded to
BITs favorably.159 The LDCs saw BITs as a mechanism to encourage
foreign investment strengthening economic development.160 Similarly, a
bilateral agreement to control carbon emission would be viewed as a way
to infuse money from the United States to encourage investment and
development within the LDCs.
The FCCC and Kyoto Protocol were multilateral agreements that
supplemented customary international law.
However, like foreign
investment, LDCs resisted compulsory measures that would compromise
their sovereignty. Although the Kyoto Protocol was signed by the LDCs,
unlike the multilateral attempts with foreign investments, their
involvement with the Protocol is largely just as cheerleaders as the
developed world takes action. Therefore LDCs were not compelled or
bound by any multilateral agreement in either the foreign investment
realm or the climate change realm.
A model bilateral agreement could be drafted by the United States
and shopped around to LDCs like BITs were. Incentives of signing a
bilateral climate change agreement would have a similar impact on a LDC
in terms of accepting more stringent requirements than customary
international law while promoting further economic investment in the
LDC by the United States, which might counterbalance any reluctance to
accept reduction targets. Furthermore, American companies would have
access to the fund as concession loans. Therefore, the American
companies would not be put at a complete disadvantage to competitors in
LDCs.
2. Bilateral Carbon Fund
The centerpiece to the bilateral agreements would be the
development of a bilateral carbon fund ("BCF"). The purpose of the BCF
could be framed to provide grants to the developing nation and concession
loans to United States entities for projects that demonstrably and
significantly reduce the current emission levels or promote
158Guzman,

supra note 147, at 642.

159The Second Wave, supra note 156, passim.
160 Guzman,

supra note 147, at 670.
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implementation of advanced technology to create a "clean development
project." Thus, there would be a fund created for the sole purpose of
effectuating and financing projects that can demonstrably reduce carbon
emissions. Appropriate projects could be those that would qualify as a
CDM; however, the administration of the projects could be significantly
streamlined. 6' The option of funding projects rather than implementing
emissions targets would likely be amenable to both the United States and
the LDCs. With only obligating itself to generate money to fund projects,
there will not be the pressure of achieving a certain level of emissions.
The nations would be free to flexibly adapt to developments with various
projects without having to meet compulsory emissions levels.
The BCF could be modeled in a similar fashion as the Montreal
Protocol's Multilateral Fund ("MLF").' 6 2 The Montreal Protocol has
some striking similarities to the Kyoto Protocol. Both treaties evolved
from the framework/protocol process, both treaties regulate the emissions
of gases harming the global environment,163 both treaties were instituted
by the developed countries taking the lead and agreeing to reduce
emissions before the LDCs,16 and both treaties encourage developed
countries to invest in projects in LDCs to reduce the respective gases.' 65
There is one interesting difference between the two treaties. While both
treaties have provisions to encourage investment in LDCs by developed
nations, the Montreal Protocol utilizes a formal mechanism that requires
developed nations to contribute money to a centralized fund.166
The Kyoto Protocol did not call for the creation of any similar
centralized fund. Rather, the Kyoto Protocol relies on the CDM as the
primary incentive for developed nations to invest in LDCs, which has
See supra notes 117 - 120 and accompanying text regarding the criticism
of the
administrative framework of CDM.
162 See generally James Andrew Bove, A Study
of the FinancialMechanism of the
MontrealProtocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 9 Envtl. Lawyer 399,
399 (2003) (discussing Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund).
163 Id. at 403-04.
64
A Tale of Two Protocols,supra note 101, at 13, 24.
Jason M. Paths, The MultilateralFund of the MontrealProtocol:A Prototypefor
FinancialMechanisms in Protectingthe Global Environment, 25 Cornell Int'l L.J. 181
(1992).
6 Id.
161
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proven to be an inadequate measure thus far.167 This is where the United
States could step in and fill some of the gaps left by the Kyoto Protocol.
The United States could create the BCF to provide grants to developing
nations to utilize for developmental projects that encourage the reduction
of carbon emissions. In doing so, the United States could use the MLF as
a model for the bilateral agreements.
Under the Montreal Protocol, the MLF is funded by developed
nations for the primary benefit of LDCs.1 68 The amount each nation is
required to contribute to the MLF is based on its gross national product.' 6 9
In turn, the fund is used as grants offered to LDCs to cover the costs of
implementing projects to reduce the use of Ozone Depleting Substances
("ODS").170 When a LDC decides to undertake a project and wants to
gamer a grant from the MLF, it applies to the Executive Board of the
MLF. 7' The Executive Board is equally comprised of representatives
from both developed nations and LDCs. 7 2 Project approval is based on
the project's cost effectiveness at reducing ODS. 17
The MLF has
successfully offered LDCs a way to reduce ODS emissions without
negatively influencing their development.174 However, commentators
have also noted that most nations have not satisfied their contribution
requirements. There is no formal mechanism specified to raise the
revenue necessary to contribute to the MLF. Nor is there an enforcement
mechanism within the treaty that provides a method of seizing funds from

delinquent nations.175
167
168

See discussion supra, section lI.C.2.
See Bove, supra note 162, at 407.

169id

1o Id. at 405.
See id. at 406-07.
172 Id. at 407.
17
1 See id. at 408.
174 See Patlis,supra note
165.
1
One method of raising and earmarking revenue would be for Congress to create a
domestic carbon tax. However, this is not the only mechanism and may result in
significant public resistance. See Divergent American Reaction, supra note 26, at 512513 (noting that 68% of Americans polled opposed a gasoline tax; 60% opposed a
business energy tax; and a large majority opposed an increase in taxes on electricity although 88% of Americans supported the Kyoto Protocol; 90% supported GHG
regulation; 79% supported increasing fuel economy; 54% supported a tax on SUVs; and
171
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The distribution of monies from the BCF could be similar to that of
the MLF from the Montreal Protocol. The Executive Board, comprised of
equal representation from the United States and the LDC, would decide
which projects to offer funding to based on an evaluation of several
criteria such as cost effectiveness, developmental value, economic
consideration, or other equitable considerations that could be included in
the model text of the bilateral agreement. Applicants may consist of both
public and private entities from either the LDC or the United States.
When a project is approved in the LDC, the funds will be offered as a
grant with no obligation to repay; however, when a project is approved in
the United States, it would be offered to the entity as a concession loan.176
It is important for the fund to be able to finance projects in both nations
because both nations need to implement measures to reduce carbon
emissions. 177 Although money should be available for both nations, the
exact separation should not be predetermined. Rather, each project should
be evaluated on a project-by-project basis. The nation that the project will
benefit could be a criterion relied on by the Executive Board when
determining whether to approve an application. As explained above, if the
Executive Board is comprised of equal representation from both the LDC
and the United States, the chance that one nation will commandeer the use
of the fund is averted.
The types of projects that the BCF would finance could include the
same types of projects that would qualify as a CDM. However, because of
the flexibility of bilateral agreements, the model text could include a more
expansive definition of appropriate projects. For instance, appropriate
projects could be those projects that encourage "smart growth" 8 or the
integration of new technology in industrial development.179
61% supported restrictions on power plants to reduce GHG emissions). Sunstein also
noted that the American public is fickle and apt to change its opinion. Id.
176 One major criticism of the MLF was that
it did not have the flexibility to offer money
as concession loans. Using concession loans expands the number of projects that the
fund can finance and offer a wider basis for emission reductions. See Bove, supra note
162, at 433.
177 The equal representation on the executive board will
assure that entities within the
United States will not be able to commandeer the BCF.
178 "Smart growth" is a term that has been utilized
in land use planning literature;
however, there is no overriding consensus of a precise definition. See Brannon P.
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Although requiring the LDCs to contribute to the BCF may be
controversial, the United States would not be likely to join any agreement
in which it bore the entire burden of funding projects in LDCs. With an
LDC contributing to the fund, it gives the LDC an equitable interest in
quickly utilizing the fund for permissible projects. The controversy of the
fact that LDCs would be contributing to the fund is also mitigated by the
fact that the projects implemented using fund monies would be through
grants to LDCs with no obligation to repay. Although the grant would be
partially funded by the LDC, and the actual percentage would depend on
how the bilateral agreement is negotiated, the bulk of the funding would
be infused through the tax or funding from the United States.
Additionally, because the LDC would have equal representation on the
Executive Board in charge of the distribution of the grants pursuant to the
fund, the LDC would have the ability to control which projects it deems
the most appropriate to implement rather than merely being a "host
country" under the CDM framework. 8 0
3. Why a Bilateral Carbon Fund
There are several reasons why the development of a BCF would be
mutually beneficial to both the United States and an LDC. The BCF does
not impose arbitrary emissions targets that might have a negative influence
Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinanceand the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine,37 URBAN LAWYER 907, note 14. However, the concept of
"smart growth" includes planning communities and development in such a way that it
optimally uses resources and space. Smart growth is one mechanism of encouraging
development while ensuring that development uses a little addition energy than is
necessary. See Adam Rose et al., Regional CarbonDioxide Permit Trading in the United
States: Coalition Choicesfor Pennsylvania, 14 PENN STATE ENVTL. L.R. 203, 208
(2006).
" These projects would not likely fit into the CDM framework because they will result
in more carbon emissions than are currently being emitted because they involve the
introduction of new developmental projects. However, over the long term, these projects
will result in a net emission reduction because they will provide a technologically
advanced infrastructure for the future.
"s Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, at Art. 12. Although the host country must be a
willing participant in the CDM process, LDCs are subject to the will of the developed
nations to decide which projects to invest in.
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on the selection of methods to reduce carbon emissions.' 8' It offers both
nations a means to take early action in preparation for the successor to the
Kyoto Protocol since these agreements could be negotiated and
implemented with greater speed than an MEA because fewer parties and
fewer issues are involved.
It is entirely likely that the United States will be politically
pressured into joining the successor while the developed nations will
require LDCs to agree to some form of emission reduction target to defuse
opposition by developed nations (most notably the United States).
Although these bilateral agreements may not make appreciable GHG
reductions in the near future, creating a fund to draw money from finance
projects will make both nations more equipped to adapt to any short-term
measures that are necessary under a successor agreement to Kyoto.
Additionally, like Kyoto, the commitment period of the successor to
Kyoto may not begin until several years after ratification of the agreement;
therefore, by the time the commitment period begins, the emission
reduction potential of any projects started with the BCF will be realized
and could be counted toward a target.
Additionally, the BCF can also uniquely serve the needs of both
nations involved. For the United States, the BCF will fulfill several needs
that it has with regard to a climate change policy. For instance, the BCF
will build the United States' credibility within the climate change realm,
which is important if the United States is to have influence during the
negotiations of the successor to Kyoto. A BCF will provide industry with
the ability to obtain loans with no interest to finance and capitalize major
projects to reduce emissions. It will also be a politically savvy method of
showing critics that the administration is taking proactive measures to
regulate the demand side of energy usage.1 82
Bilateral agreements offer the United States total control of its
international commitments because there are only two nations involved in
the negotiation. The United States would be able to unilaterally develop
its model text and offer it to LDCs with a "take-or-leave" attitude like it
181With

emissions targets, achieving short-term emissions reduction is emphasized
more
than the long-term viability of maintaining reduced emissions.
182 David Garmen & David Hayes, Bush and Kerry:
Competing Visions for US. Energy
Policy, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.R. 201, 206 (2004).
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does with BITs. Bilateral agreements would provide more flexibility than
multilateral agreements. Because of the flexibility, the risk would be
minimized' 8 3 with the potential for great rewards.' 8 The most important
benefit, though, is that a BCF addresses the United States' major concerns
with Kyoto - economics and LDCs' commitments. It spreads the costs of
implementing projects to reduce carbon both within the United States and
to LDCs. Also, the BCF can get the other largest emitters with no
obligations under Kyoto, like China and India, to start curtailing their
exponentially increasing emissions.
Similarly, there is a large incentive for LDCs to join in these
bilateral agreements. The most obvious incentive is that there will be a
major influx of additional money from the United States available for
development.
This influx will spur development - economically,
technologically, and socially. It will offer grants to these nations for
projects that will give the LDC more energy independence, more
opportunity for foreign investment, and more jobs for its populace to
implement these projects. Because the BCF is flexible, it can offer a
wider range of projects than the CDM.
Along with the additional financial resources available, entering
into a BCF agreement with the United States will better prepare the LDC
for the future of climate change policy. With the successor of Kyoto
looming in the near future, it is possible that the developed nations are
going to clamor for commitments from LDCs.'8 5 Taking early action to
reduce GHG emissions will soften the impact those commitments would
have on the future development of the nation. Instituting a framework to
reduce emissions now will better inform the LDC of its capacity to
achieve certain targets and the cost thereof. During the Kyoto Protocol's
negotiations, LDCs were unwilling to accept any obligations because the
ability to effectuate and finance a reduction in their emissions was
183

Risk could be minimized with using sunset provisions, maximum monetary

contributions, or any other escape clause that United States sees fit because it is
developing the model text.
184 Even if there several escape clauses the could be used in the document to keep risk at
a minimum, if all goes as planned, there would be no need for using the escape clauses.
185 This possibility is only accentuated by the fact that critics of Kyoto claim
that it will
achieve little in terms of long term influence on climate change because of its failure to
include LDCs. Drumble, supra note 94, at 85.

527

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. 3
unknown.186 With the implementation of a BCF, the LDCs would be able
to gather information regarding the costs of reducing emissions and be in a
better position to understand what it is capable of achieving.
There are several drawbacks of using bilateral instruments to
effectuate climate change policy. First, bilateral instruments do not offer
the ability to create a comprehensive global response to a global issue.
Second, the transaction and administrative costs are higher with bilateral
agreements as compared to MEAs since each bilateral treaty needs to be
separately negotiated, implemented, and administered. Third, there will
be a time lag between the implementation of the BCF agreements and the
realization of the reduction in emissions because the BCF needs to be
established, applications will need to be created, and projects will need to
be built. It is entirely possible that the successor to the Kyoto Protocol
will be fully negotiated before the effectiveness of the BCF is realized.
However, the mere fact of taking a proactive measure to reduce emissions
may serve the political goals of the United States even if it has not
achieved the emission goals of the project. However, many of these
drawbacks can be appropriately accounted for in the agreements to
minimize any negative effect of the BCF. The positive aspects of the BCF
far outweigh any of the drawbacks.
IV. CONCLUSION

Climate change is a reality. There is a need for an immediate
response to attempt to abate the effects of climate change. The United
States has an ethical obligation to take action to reduce its contribution to
the problem of climate change; however, the United States has decided not
to join the international effort of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, the
United States should take its own unilateral efforts to reduce its domestic
emissions. However, because the United States is one of the only
developed nations not forced to meet an emissions target pursuant to an
obligation under Kyoto, it is in a unique position to tie its unilateral efforts
to reduce emissions into a bilateral effort with LDCs that also have no
obligation to reduce emissions under Kyoto. A BCF offers such a way for
"' Ved P. Nanda , The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change andthe Challenges to its
Implementation:A Commentary, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL. 319, 333 (1999).
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both nations to flexibly control how it chooses to implement new ways to
reduce carbon emissions.
Assuming a BCF is a viable and desirable method for the United
States to begin implementing, the question remains as to what direction
the world will move to in 2012 when the first commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol is over. Bilateral agreements are not likely a workable
substitute for MEAs. In fact, bilateral agreements are probably only best
used when an MEA is inadequate or impossible. In the case of climate
change, the Kyoto Protocol satisfies both conditions when considering
nations like the United States and the LDCs. Therefore, a bilateral
agreement can provide a tool to patch the gap, but it is not likely to be a
long-term solution to climate change. Rather, it is more likely that
bilateral agreements may serve as novel supplements to MEAs, depending
on what the nations are willing to agree upon for the successor to Kyoto.
This is not to say that bilateral agreements and MEAs are mutually
exclusive.
In fact the two can be concurrently, consistently and
coextensively used. Bilateral agreements can help to refine methods of
achieving obligations under MEAs, assist nations unable to meet their
obligations by finding a suitable partnership with another nation to
mutually help each other reduce emissions, and build on MEAs for nations
willing to act courageously and experiment with social policies without
risking an international fallout.
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